Broadband Privacy by Sean Howell
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 58 | Number 1 Article 2
6-2-2018
Broadband Privacy
Sean Howell
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Law Review by an authorized editor of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact sculawlibrarian@gmail.com,
pamjadi@scu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sean Howell, Broadband Privacy, 58 Santa Clara L. Rev. 59 (2018).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol58/iss1/2
59 
BROADBAND PRIVACY 
Sean Howell* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction ....................................................................................... 60 
I. A Brief Introduction to Broadband Privacy ..................................... 62 
II. Comparing the FTC and FCC Approaches ..................................... 67 
A. FCC Broadband Privacy Order ........................................... 67 
1. Statutory Authority ....................................................... 67 
2. Privacy Provisions ........................................................ 70 
a. Notice ..................................................................... 70 
b. Choice .................................................................... 71 
3. Security Provisions ....................................................... 72 
B. Likely FTC Regulation of Broadband Privacy ..................... 72 
1. FTC Statutory Authority over Broadband Privacy
Practices ..................................................................... 73 
2. The FTC’s Substantive Approach to Broadband
Privacy ....................................................................... 75 
C. Comparing FCC and FTC Regulation of Broadband
Privacy ............................................................................. 77 
1. Comparing the Commissions’ Substantive Rules .......... 77 
2. Comparing the Commissions’ Procedural
Approaches ................................................................. 84 
III. Three Questions for the FTC Regarding Broadband Privacy ......... 87 
A. Are Broadband Providers Special? ...................................... 87 
1. Market Power ............................................................... 88 
2. Visibility ...................................................................... 89 
3. Access to Data .............................................................. 91 
* Sean is a law clerk to the Honorable Charles R. Breyer (N.D. Cal).  He is also a
former Ninth Circuit clerk and a recent graduate of Berkeley Law.  He is interested in the 
implications of technological change for telecommunications policy, data-protection law, 
antitrust, and speech regulation.  Many thanks to Christopher Klapperich and the staff of the 
Santa Clara Law Review for their thoughtful suggestions and their incisive, careful editing. 
60 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:58 
B. How Should the FTC Reconcile Broadband Privacy and
Net Neutrality? ................................................................. 92 
C. Will the FTC Prioritize Broadband Privacy? ....................... 95 
Conclusion ........................................................................................ 97 
INTRODUCTION 
When the Obama-era Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) issued the Open Internet Order, establishing net neutrality rules, 
its action had the side effect of handing the FCC responsibility for 
policing the data-protection practices of broadband internet access 
providers (“broadband providers”).1  The Commission took an 
aggressive approach to broadband privacy—pursuing the first-ever 
privacy enforcement action against a broadband provider, and passing 
what was likely the most stringent prescriptive data-privacy regulation 
in American history to date.  But the FCC’s patrol of the privacy beat 
was short-lived.  Following the election of President Donald Trump, 
the Commission’s new Republican majority suspended the broadband 
privacy rules, and Congress later scrapped them altogether.  The 
Commission subsequently repealed the Open Internet Order, a move 
that had the collateral effect of restoring jurisdiction over broadband 
privacy to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). 
While the FCC’s detailed privacy rules are no longer, they 
continue to inspire debate.  Several state legislatures have taken up the 
issue of whether they should enact their own broadband privacy rules, 
modeled after the repealed federal regulations.2  In addition, the FCC’s 
rules provide a helpful jumping-off point for analyzing the existing 
state of broadband-privacy enforcement, and for assessing the shape 
that enforcement should take under the FTC.  The privacy practices of 
broadband providers have largely flown under the radar, with the 
practices of “edge providers”3 such as Google and Facebook receiving 
1. The Open Internet Order reclassified broadband as a common-carrier service under
Title II of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  In re Protecting and Promoting the Open 
Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5604-5607 (2015) [hereinafter Open Internet Order].  This 
indirectly stripped the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) of jurisdiction to police broadband 
providers’ privacy practices under Section 5 of the FTC Act, because Section 5 does not 
apply to common carriers.  See 15 U.S.C. § 45; see also infra Part I at 104–09. 
2. See Ernesto Falcon, Legislative Analysis, How Silicon Valley’s Dirty Tricks Helped
Stall Broadband Privacy in California, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Oct. 23, 
2017), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/10/how-silicon-valleys-dirty-tricks-helped-stall-
broadband-privacy-california [hereinafter Falcon, Broadband Privacy in California]. 
3. Edge providers are firms that use the broadband network to provide content,
applications, and other services to end users.  See Open Internet Order, supra note 1, at 
5608. 
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the lion’s share of attention from consumer advocates, media outlets, 
academics, and regulators.  But large broadband providers’ ability to 
collect data on individuals are approached by those of only a handful of 
firms, and their privacy practices are accordingly worthy of attention. 
This Article seeks to untangle some of the knottier issues 
regarding broadband privacy.  Part I provides a brief introduction to 
privacy issues that have arisen in the broadband space.4  Part II offers 
the first comprehensive comparison between the FCC’s repealed 
broadband privacy rules and the FTC’s likely enforcement of 
broadband privacy under its authority to police unfair and deceptive 
trade practices.5  Privacy advocates lamented the loss of the FCC as a 
broadband-privacy enforcer, apparently assuming that FTC 
enforcement would not be as robust.  However, looking to past FTC 
enforcement actions and policy statements to anticipate the 
Commission’s likely approach to broadband privacy, this Article posits 
that the FTC’s enforcement regime is actually likely to be quite similar 
to the FCC’s aborted regulation in most respects.  While there are a 
couple of points on which FTC regulation will probably be less 
stringent, this fact will likely benefit consumers on the whole by 
fostering competition in nearby data-intensive markets.  Moreover, the 
FTC’s loose, standards-based procedural approach is preferable to the 
FCC’s highly prescriptive rules because it provides needed regulatory 
flexibility in a rapidly evolving area. 
A number of questions remain about the details of how the FTC 
will enforce privacy standards against broadband providers.  Part III 
examines three particularly pressing questions.6  First, should privacy 
standards be enforced differently against broadband providers than 
against other firms?  That is, do broadband providers’ market positions 
and access to data, as well as the relative lack of visibility of their data-
collection practices, justify the application of stricter privacy rules?  
Second, should the FTC make an exception to its privacy standards for 
the practice of scrutinizing Internet traffic in order to provide different 
treatment to different types of content and applications?  Conversely, 
should the Commission use its privacy rules as a backdoor means of 
“net neutrality” regulation?  Third, how is the FTC’s enforcement of 
broadband providers’ privacy practices likely to play out on the 
ground? 
4. See infra Part I. 
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part III.
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I. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO BROADBAND PRIVACY
There has been much discussion of the ability of so-called “edge 
providers” such as Google and Facebook to monitor user behavior 
online. 7  Until fairly recently, however, comparatively little attention 
has been paid to the implications of data collection by broadband 
internet access providers—firms like AT&T, Comcast, and Time 
Warner that provide access to substantially all Internet endpoints at 
speeds faster than dial-up, through wired connections and/or cellular 
networks.8 
Internet service providers (ISPs) have been testing various 
monitoring practices for years, but have usually backed away from 
collecting customers’ data following detection, bad publicity, and legal 
action.  The first public attempt by a stateside telecommunications 
(telecom) provider to collect, store, and process user data for 
advertising purposes came in 2008, when Charter partnered with a firm 
called NebuAd to collect and analyze information on broadband 
customers’ browsing behavior, using the information to help content 
providers target advertisements to web users.9  A consumer backlash 
followed, however, and Charter quickly suspended its plans.10 
In 2011, two Berkeley computer scientists discovered that ISPs 
were tracking consumers’ use of certain search terms for marketing 
purposes.11  The providers again quickly announced that they were 
dropping the practice.12 
Most recently, reports emerged in 2014 that Verizon Wireless had 
injected unique identifiers known as tracking headers or 
“supercookies”13 into the Internet traffic of over 100 million customers 
7. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Deciders: The Future of Privacy and Free Speech in
the Age of Facebook and Google, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1525 (2012).
8. 47 CFR § 8.2(a). 
9. Saul Hansell, Charter Suspends Plans to Sell Customer Data to Advertisers, N.Y.
TIMES (June 24, 2008), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/24/charter-suspends-plan-to-
sell-customer-data-to-advertisers/. 
10. Id. 
11. Jim Giles, US Internet Providers Hijacking Users’ Search Queries, NEW SCIENTIST
(Aug. 9, 2011), https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn20768-us-internet-providers-
hijacking-users-search-queries/. 
12. Id. 
13. “Supercookies” refers to unique identifiers inserted into the headers of users’ web
traffic in order to track users across the web and serve targeted advertisements to them.  In 
re Cellco P’ship d/b/a Verizon Wireless, 31 FCC Rcd. 1843, 1847 (2016) [hereinafter 
Verizon Order].  They are known as “supercookies” because users cannot easily delete 
them, as they can with the cookies that websites use to track users.  See Robert McMillan, 
Verizon’s ‘Perma-Cookie’ Is a Privacy-Killing Machine, WIRED (Oct. 27, 2014), 
https://www.wired.com/2014/10/verizons-perma-cookie/. 
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on its mobile network.14  This practice allowed Verizon and its partners 
to gather data on the web-browsing habits of those customers, and 
made it impossible for customers to prevent the tracking except by 
encrypting their web traffic or using a virtual private network (VPN).15  
A subsequent FCC investigation found that Verizon had begun 
inserting tracking headers into internet traffic as early as 2012.16  
AT&T acknowledged that it had also engaged in the practice, and 
agreed to desist.17  The FCC eventually filed a complaint against 
Verizon, and the parties reached a settlement.18 
Shortly thereafter, the FCC began developing comprehensive rules 
governing broadband providers’ collection, storage, and use of 
customer data.19  At least in theory, broadband privacy had previously 
fallen within the FTC’s regulatory domain, pursuant to the 
Commission’s capacious authority to police “unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce” under Section 5 of the FTC Act.20  
However, the FCC’s 2015 reclassification of broadband as a common-
carrier service pursuant to Title II of the Communications Act21 
indirectly stripped the FTC of its privacy jurisdiction over broadband 
providers, because Section 5 does not apply to common carriers.22  
Accordingly, the FCC reasoned that it would have to assume 
responsibility for broadband privacy if it wished to avoid a “gap” in the 
American privacy regime.23 
In the days leading up to the 2016 presidential election, the 
Obama FCC rolled out its Broadband Privacy Order, a 169-page 
whopper (excluding appendices) that covered the collection, storage, 
and use of customer data by broadband providers.24  The order was 
short-lived, however.  Before it went into effect, the FCC stayed it in 
14. Verizon Order, supra note 12, at 1847–51; see also McMillan, supra note 12. 
15. Id. at 1847–51. 
16. Id. 
17. Elizabeth Weise, AT&T Ends Tracking of Customers by “Supercookie,” USA 
TODAY (Nov. 14, 2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/11/14/att-supercookies-
tracking/19041911/. 
18. Verizon Order, supra note 12, at 1843–44. 
19. In re Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other 
Telecommunications Services, 31 FCC Rcd. 2500, 2508 (2016) [hereinafter Broadband 
Privacy NPRM]. 
20. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). 
21. Open Internet Order, supra note 1, at 5604–07. 
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2). 
23. In re Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other 
Telecommunications Services, WC Docket. No. 16–148, 2016 WL 6538282, 14051 (2016) 
[hereinafter Broadband Privacy Order]. 
24. See generally id. 
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part.25  Shortly thereafter, Congress passed and President Trump signed 
legislation repealing it.26  The other shoe dropped when the Trump 
FCC repealed the Open Internet Order, terminating the classification of 
broadband providers as common carriers and thereby restoring the 
FTC’s jurisdiction over those providers’ privacy practices pursuant to 
Section 5.27 
Consumer advocates met the repeal of the FCC’s rules with 
dismay.  “Today’s vote means that Americans will never be safe online 
from having their most personal details stealthily scrutinized and sold 
to the highest bidder,” Jeffrey Chester, executive director of the Center 
for Digital Democracy, told The Washington Post.28  Obama holdovers 
at both the FCC and FTC issued a press release calling the move “the 
antithesis of putting #ConsumersFirst.”29  State legislators introduced 
bills to reinstate the FCC’s rules at the state level.30 
Meanwhile, the newly installed Republican chairs of the FCC and 
FTC urged people not to believe the “hyperventilating headlines” 
warning of dire privacy consequences.31  They asserted that the FCC’s 
rules would have distorted competition in the Internet ecosystem, and 
that returning privacy jurisdiction over broadband providers to the FTC 
25. In re Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other
Telecommunications Services, 30 FCC Rcd. (2017), https://transition.fcc.gov/
Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2017/db0301/FCC-17-19A1.pdf [hereinafter Protecting the 
Privacy of Customers]. 
26. Steve Lohr, Trump Completes Repeal of Online Privacy Protections from Obama
Era, N.Y. TIMES (April 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/technology/trump-
repeal-online-privacy-protections.html.  The Trump FCC had stayed the order the day 
before it was scheduled to go into effect.  Protecting the Privacy of Customers, supra note 
24. 
27. FCC, In re Restoring Internet Freedom, Declaratory Ruling, Report and Order, and
Order, 2018 WL 305638, at *8–10, *23–26 (Jan. 4, 2018).  Note that the repeal order might 
be subject to challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act.  See, e.g., Nat’l Cable and 
Telecom. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981–82 (2005) (agency action 
arbitrary and capricious where agency fails to adequately explain reasons for change of 
course). 
28. Brian Fung, The House Just Voted to Wipe Away the FCC’s Landmark Internet
Privacy Protections, WASH. POST (March 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-switch/wp/2017/03/28/the-house-just-voted-to-wipe-out-the-fccs-landmark-
internet-privacy-protections/. 
29. Press Release, Joint Statement of FCC Commissioner Mignon Clyburn and FTC
Commissioner Terrell McSweeny, FCC (Mar. 23, 2017), https://transition.fcc.gov/
Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2017/db0323/DOC-344042A1.pdf. 
30. See Falcon, Broadband Privacy in California, supra note 2. 
31. Ajit Pai & Maureen Ohlhausen, No, Republicans Didn’t Just Strip Away your
Internet Privacy Rights, WASH. POST (April 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/opinions/no-republicans-didnt-just-strip-away-your-internet-privacy-rights/2017/04/04/
73e6d500-18ab-11e7-9887-1a5314b56a08_story.html. 
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would ensure a “comprehensive framework that will protect . . . 
privacy throughout the Internet.”32 
Part II evaluates these competing claims in comparing the FTC’s 
likely enforcement of broadband privacy to the FCC’s Broadband 
Privacy Order.  First, however, understanding the issues in play 
requires a rudimentary technical understanding of broadband 
providers’ ability to monitor the traffic that flows through their 
networks. 
When a user types a web address into her browser, the broadband 
provider transmits the website’s contents from the edge provider to the 
user in the form of “packets.”33  Each of these packets carries data 
about the site.34  The packets are reassembled when they reach the user 
to form intelligible content.35 
Each packet contains several different types of information.  Two 
are relevant to our purposes.  First, packets contain “headers,” which 
convey an internet protocol (IP) address that tells the broadband 
provider where it must route the packet.36  Second, packets contain an 
“application payload,” which transmits the substance of the data being 
conveyed.37 
In inserting supercookies into customers’ traffic, Verizon and 
AT&T only interacted with the headers of packets, appending a unique 
identifier to the address information.38  If the recipient website had an 
arrangement with the broadband provider, the website could match the 
identifier to a particular user and access the provider’s store of 
information about that user.39  It could then use that information to 
serve the user relevant ads.40 
The header is the only part of the packet a broadband provider 
must read in order to route traffic.41  However, carriers have also 
32. Id. 
33. JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS:
AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE DIGITAL AGE 42 (1st ed. 2007). 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Duncan Geere, How Deep Packet Inspection Works, WIRED (Apr. 27, 2012),
http://www.wired.co.uk/article/how-deep-packet-inspection-works. 
37. Id. 
38. Jacob Hoffman Andrews, Verizon Injecting Perma-Cookies to Track Mobile 
Customers, Bypassing Privacy Controls, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Nov. 3, 
2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/11/verizon-x-uidh; see also Jacob Davidson, 
Verizon and AT&T Snooping on Customers’ Web Activity, TIME (Nov. 4, 2014), 
http://time.com/money/3556165/verizon-att-supercookies/. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. See Geere, supra note 34. 
66 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:58 
developed the ability to examine the payload of the packet.42  This 
practice is known as “deep packet inspection,” or “DPI.”43  It has 
attracted much attention from data-privacy advocates, because it 
enables broadband providers to view potentially sensitive contents of 
messages sent by users—for example, e-mails, chats, and information 
entered into web forms.44  However, the practice is not yet cost-
effective or widely used, and by some accounts may never be.45  Nick 
Feamster, professor of computer science at Princeton University, has 
called DPI a “red herring” in discussions of broadband privacy because 
it remains too expensive to be widely used,46 notwithstanding dramatic 
declines in data-storage costs in recent years.47  AT&T and Verizon 
have insisted that they do not use deep packet inspection for marketing 
purposes, and would not do so without first seeking affirmative express 
consent from customers.48  Accordingly, broadband providers’ ability 
to track users’ movements around the web via packet headers appears 
to be the more pressing privacy issue at the moment.49 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Letter from Nick Feamster, Professor, Dep’t of Computer Sci., Princeton U., to
Chairman & Comm’rs of the Fed. Comm. Comm’n, RE: Docket. No. 16-106, Protecting the 
Privacy of Customers of Broadband and other Telecommunications Services 6 (May 27, 
2016), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/60002079367.pdf [hereinafter Feamster Comment Letter]. 
46. Id. 
47. John Hagel et al., From Exponential Technologies to Exponential Innovation,
DELOITTE Figure 2 (Oct. 4, 2013), http://dupress.com/articles/from-exponential-
technologies-to-exponential-innovation/ (noting drop in data storage costs $569 to $0.03 per 
gigabyte between 1992 and 2002). 
48. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE 55 (2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-
commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/
120326privacyreport.pdf [hereinafter FTC PRIVACY REPORT]. 
49. The Future of Privacy Forum has stated that “the types of data that are available
and being used for ad targeting today are quite visible and widely available.”  Reply 
Comments from the Future of Privacy Forum to Fed. Comm. Comm’n on WC Docket. No. 
16-106, FCC 5, (Jul. 6, 2016), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10706083993286/FCC%
20Reply% 20Filing%20-%207.6.16.pdf.  Broadband providers appear poised to exploit web-
browsing and application-usage information.  See Comments of AT&T Servs. Inc., In re
Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and other Telecommunications Services,
WC Docket. No. 16-106, at 60 (May 27, 2016), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/60002080023.pdf
[hereinafter AT&T Comment Letter]; Rich McCormick, Verizon Will Share your Browsing
Habits with AOL’s Massive Ad Network, THE VERGE (Oct. 6, 2015),
https://www.theverge.com/2015/10/ 6/9468025/verizon-will-share-your-browsing-habits-
with-aols-massive-ad-network; Brian Fung, Internet Providers Want to Know More about
You than Google Does, Privacy Groups Say, WASH. POST. (Jan. 20, 2016) (describing a
“land-grab for ad targeting technology”), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2016/01/20/your-internet-provider-is-turning-into-a-data-hungry-tech-company-
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Broadband providers have been experimenting with collecting 
user data for years.  It is only recently that the practice has attracted 
serious regulatory attention, however.  The next section delves deeper 
into the FCC’s plans to regulate broadband privacy under Title II of the 
Telecommunications Act, and the FTC’s likely approach under Section 
5 of the FTC Act. 
II. COMPARING THE FTC AND FCC APPROACHES
 While defenders and opponents of the FCC’s Broadband Privacy 
Order alike seem to agree that the FCC’s rules marked a significant 
departure from the FTC privacy framework,50 the analysis offered here 
suggests that the FTC’s substantive approach is in fact likely to be 
quite similar to the FCC’s.  The only significant difference is the type 
of consent broadband providers are required to obtain from users 
before collecting web-browsing and app-usage data.  While the FCC’s 
rule may have been somewhat more privacy-protective, the FTC’s 
substantive standards are preferable in terms of overall consumer 
welfare because they are more likely to encourage competition in 
nearby data-driven markets.  In addition, the flexibility afforded by 
Section 5 of the FTC Act is preferable to the FCC’s rulemaking 
approach when it comes to broadband privacy, because it will enable 
the FTC to adjust its privacy standards amid rapid technological 
change, as the costs and benefits of data collection become clearer. 
A. FCC Broadband Privacy Order
The FCC’s short-lived Broadband Privacy Order remains the most
detailed regulatory assessment of the issues surrounding broadband 
privacy to date.  This section describes the statutory authority on which 
the FCC’s order was based, and details the substance of the FCC’s 
order. 
1. Statutory Authority
While the Telecommunications Act of 1996 contains provisions
that apply more clearly to data privacy than does the FTC Act, the 
FCC’s statutory authority in the privacy realm is likely more limited 
than the FTC’s.  The FCC located the authority for its Broadband 
Privacy Order in § 222 of the Telecommunications Act.51  Section 222 
consumer-groups-warn/. 
50. See Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, at 210 (Pai, Comm’r, dissenting). 
51. See 47 U.S.C. § 222. 
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provides that “[e]very telecommunications carrier has a duty to protect 
the confidentiality of proprietary information of, and relating to, other 
telecommunication carriers, equipment manufacturers, and 
customers.”52  The provision bars dominant telecom carriers from using 
other carriers’ information for any purpose other than to facilitate 
interconnection with the network.53  It also limits carriers’ ability to use 
and disclose information pertaining to customers.54   
The Broadband Privacy Order expanded the scope of the FCC’s 
previous interpretations of § 222 in two major ways.  Most obviously, 
the order brought broadband services within § 222’s reach; previously, 
the section had only applied to wireline telephone providers.55   
The order also expanded the types of customer information 
subject to § 222.  Scholars often divide privacy statutes between those 
that protect communicative attributes, and those that protect 
communicative content.56  Until the FCC’s recent aggressive privacy 
enforcement, § 222 was considered an example of the former.57  The 
clearest indication that § 222 was designed to protect communicative 
attributes rather than content is its use of the term “customer 
proprietary network information” (CPNI), rather than the term 
“personally identifiable information” (PII).58  PII is typically invoked 
in statutes meant to protect content information.59  The FCC had 
previously held that CPNI, in contrast, covered information kept on file 
by telephone companies, such as addresses, bills, and “pen register” 
information (e.g., the number called, the time of a call, and the duration 
of a call).60  This is classic “attribute” information.61  Indeed, in prior 
orders, the FCC had explicitly stated that “call content information is 
not considered CPNI.”62 
52. Id. § 222(a). 
53. Id. § 222(b). 
54. Id. § 222(c).
55. Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, at ¶ 1. 
56. See Susan Freiwald, Uncertain Privacy: Communication Attributes after the Digital
Telephony Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 949, 950–52 (1996). 
57. See Fred H. Cate, Privacy and Telecommunications, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1,
40 (1998) (describing 47 U.S.C. § 222 as protecting “communication attributes” rather than 
content). 
58. 47 U.S.C. § 222(c). 
59. See Freiwald, supra note 54, at 1014–16.  For instance, the Telecommunications
Act protects the personally identifiable information of both satellite and cable subscribers. 
47 U.S.C. §§ 338(i)(1)(A), 551.  
60. In re Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 22 F.C.C. Rcd.
6927, 6975–76 (citing app’x B subpart U.2) (2007). 
61. See Freiwald, supra note 54, at 953–55. 
62. In re Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 FCC Rcd. 12513, 
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The Broadband Privacy Order, however, interpreted § 222 as 
protecting content, requiring the Commission to significantly expand 
its interpretation of the statute.63  The FCC did so in two significant 
ways.  First, it broadened the definition of CPNI, holding that CPNI 
now included “any part of the substance, purport, or meaning of a 
communication.”64  Second, the Commission held that the § 222 
covered more categories of information than just CPNI—insisting that 
it protected “customer proprietary information” (PI), as well.65  The 
Commission described PI as all the data to which broadband providers 
have access “in connection with their provision of service”66—that is, 
every piece of customer data, more or less.  This included information 
such as names and addresses that the Commission had previously 
excluded from its definition of CPNI.67  This was a dramatic re-
interpretation of the statute.  It marked a departure from earlier orders 
interpreting § 222 in the telephony context, and finds no support in the 
FCC’s Computer Inquiries—the rulemaking proceedings in which the 
terms “customer proprietary information” (PI) and “customer 
proprietary network information” (CPNI) first appeared, where the 
Commission used the terms interchangeably.68 
Assessing the validity of the FCC’s interpretation of § 222 is 
beyond the scope of this Article.  It is merely worth noting that the 
FCC appeared to be covering its bases in finding overlapping grants of 
authority so that its rules could survive even if a reviewing court 
rejected part of the Commission’s interpretation of § 222.69  Indeed, the 
Commission even established a backstop in case a court invalidated its 
interpretation of § 222 entirely, maintaining that Title II’s general anti-
discrimination and “reasonable rate” provisions, in addition to other 
sections of the Telecommunications Act, provided independent 
authority for its privacy rules.70 
12532 (1996). 
63. Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶ 6. 
64. Id. ¶ 102. 
65. Id. ¶¶ 85–87. 
66. Id. ¶ 266. 
67. Id. ¶ 95. 
68. Id. ¶ 369. 
69. Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶ 102 (noting that content is protected
both as CPNI, and as an independent category); see also id. ¶ 353 (“Even assuming a 
contrary reading of Section 222(a), subsection (c) would still invest the Commission with 
substantial regulatory authority over personal information that BIAS providers and other 
telecommunications carriers collect from their customers . . . .”). 
70. Id. ¶ 297. 
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2. Privacy Provisions
The FCC built its order around the notice-and-choice framework
so familiar in American privacy law.  It laid the groundwork by 
adopting a notably broad conception of the harm occasioned by 
broadband providers’ collection, storage, and use of customer data, 
finding that the threats posed by such practices included “not only 
identity theft or financial loss but also reputational damage, personal 
embarrassment, or loss of control over the exposure of intimate 
personal details.”71  The FCC especially relied on the last item—loss of 
control—to justify far-reaching privacy protections, tailoring its rules 
to guard against not only improper uses of customer information, but 
also the mere act of collecting and storing data.72 
a. Notice
The Commission laid out nuanced requirements for both the type 
of information privacy notices must contain, and the manner in which 
notices must be presented to consumers.73  First, it required broadband 
providers to inform potential customers of their privacy practices at the 
point of sale to give them a fair chance to decide whether or not to 
subscribe to the service.74  It also mandated that privacy policies 
“clearly and accurately inform” customers of all material privacy 
practices,75 and that the policies be readable—“written and formatted in 
ways that ensure the material information in them is comprehensible 
and easily understood.”76   
The rules further required the notices to give customers 
information about the types of data collected; how data would be used; 
with whom and for what purposes data would be shared; and how 
customers could exercise choices regarding data collection.77  The 
Commission specifically required providers to reassure customers that 
refusing to authorize data collection would not result in "degraded 
service."78  
The FCC also mandated that providers make their privacy policies 
easily accessible through their websites and applications,79 and that 
71. Id. ¶ 266. 
72. Id. ¶¶ 267, 379–80. 
73. Id. ¶¶ 122–65. 
74. Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶ 138. 
75. Id. ¶ 134. 
76. Id. ¶ 147.
77. Id. ¶ 122.
78. Id. ¶ 134.
79. Id. ¶ 8.
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they present the choice mechanism simultaneous with the notice.80  
Finally, the Commission required carriers to notify customers in 
advance of material retroactive changes to their privacy policies.81 
b. Choice
The FCC also spelled out the form of customer approval carriers 
were required to obtain in order to collect, use, and share certain types 
of information.82  These choice provisions were what occasioned much 
of the controversy around the Broadband Privacy Order. 
The Commission placed data-related practices into one of three 
categories of required approval: (1) “opt-in” choice, that is, practices 
for which carriers were required to obtain express affirmative consent; 
(2) “opt-out” choice, that is, practices carriers had to enable customers
to avoid if they so chose; and (3) practices that did not require any form
of choice.83  In its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM”), the
Commission had initially suggested more lenient treatment of
providers’ collection of data for certain types of first-party marketing,84
but it scratched this proposal in the final rule.85
At first glance, the difference between opt-in and opt-out choice 
may not seem particularly significant.  In practice, however, the 
distinction is quite important.  As Commissioner Michael O’Rielly 
noted in dissenting from the FCC order, approval schemes basically 
function as property rules, given that most customers ignore privacy 
notices and simply stick with the default setting.86  Opt-in choice tends 
to vest this property right in the customer, opt-out choice in the 
collector.87 
The Commission decided to require opt-in approval for 
“sensitive” data, which it defined to include the content of 
communications, as well as web-browsing and application-usage 
history and their “functional equivalents”—a catch-all term that would 
give the Commission flexibility to regulate new types of interfaces 
emerging with the so-called “Internet of Things” (a term used to 
describe physical objects that send and receive data over the web).88  
80. Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶ 133.
81. Id. ¶ 195.
82. Id. ¶¶ 166–234.
83. Id. ¶ 9.
84. See Broadband Privacy NPRM, supra note 18, at 2532.
85. Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶¶ 199–200.
86. Id. at 216 (O’Rielly, Comm’r, dissenting).
87. See id. 
88. Id. ¶¶ 181, 185.  The Commission also classified certain types of information as
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The Commission also required opt-in consent for material retroactive 
changes to privacy policies.89  It mandated opt out approval for all 
other forms of data gathering, save those expressly exempted in 
§ 222.90
The FCC also stated that it would allow firms to pay customers to 
opt in to data collection.91  However, the Commission cautioned that it 
was prohibiting “take-it-or-leave-it offering[ings] [of] . . . broadband 
service contingent on customers surrendering their privacy rights.”92  It 
did not specify how exactly it would evaluate when payment for data 
would rise to the level of a violation, saying only that it would step in if 
customers were “essentially compelled to choose between protecting 
their personal information and very high prices.”93 
3. Security Provisions
Finally, the Commission imposed requirements relating to data
security and data-breach notification.94  It required carriers to take 
“reasonable measures” to ensure the security of customers’ data,95 
declining to impose more specific requirements because it recognized 
that “what constitutes ‘reasonable’ data security is an evolving 
concept.”96  And it required providers to notify the FCC, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Secret Service within seven 
business days of any data breach, unless the breach posed “no 
reasonable risk of . . . harm.”97  It modeled this requirement on state 
data-breach-notification statutes.98 
B. Likely FTC Regulation of Broadband Privacy
It is difficult to make an apples-to-apples comparison between the
FCC’s and FTC’s regulation of broadband privacy, given the 
sensitive, such as Social Security numbers and medical data, id. ¶ 9, but these categories 
were arguably redundant given the inclusion of content, browsing history, and app usage 
history. 
89. Id. ¶ 195.
90. Id. ¶ 9.
91. Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶ 298–303. 
92. Id. ¶ 294–97. 
93. Id. ¶ 303.
94. See generally id. ¶ 235–60.
95. See generally id. ¶ 238–47.  The Commission did not detail practices that would
meet this standard.  It suggested that it was essentially incorporating the FTC’s approach to 
data security, as it has developed in dozens of Section 5 enforcement actions.  See id. ¶ 240. 
96. Id. ¶ 236. 
97. Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶ 264, 278.
98. Id. ¶ 264 
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commissions’ divergent approaches.  While the FCC enshrined its 
planned regulation in a detailed rule, the FTC, for all intents and 
purposes, lacks rulemaking authority.99  Instead, it enforces privacy 
requirements pursuant to the open-ended mandate of Section 5 of the 
FTC Act, which condemns “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce.”100   
Accordingly, in order to discern the likely shape of the FTC’s 
enforcement of broadband privacy, we must look to the Commission’s 
past privacy-enforcement actions and policy statements.  The FTC has 
detailed its views on privacy best practices in guidelines, press releases, 
workshops, and white papers—documents that Professors Woodrow 
Hartzog and Dan Solove describe as “soft law,” similar to dicta in 
judicial opinions.101  In addition, the FTC has brought so many privacy 
actions that its interpretation of Section 5’s standards has hardened into 
rule-like form, as Hartzog and Solove have argued.102  While its 
privacy settlements lack precedential force, the FTC “has demonstrated 
a commitment to remaining consistent in practice.”103 
Analyzing the FTC’s enforcement actions and policy statements 
enables us to understand how the Commission might enforce Section 5 
against broadband providers now that it has the authority to do so, and 
points up areas where the Commission’s approach will need further 
development.  It also reveals that the difference between the two 
commissions’ approaches may be slighter than either privacy advocates 
or objectors to the FCC’s rules have supposed. 
1. FTC Statutory Authority over Broadband Privacy Practices
The FTC does not have specific statutory authority to regulate
data privacy.  Instead, it brings privacy actions pursuant to its general 
99. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 620 (2014) [hereinafter Solove & Hartzog, New 
Common Law] (“[F]or Section 5 enforcement – one of the largest areas of its jurisprudence 
– the FTC has only Magnuson-Moss rulemaking authority, which is so procedurally
burdensome that it is largely ineffective.”). 
100. 15 U.S.C. § 45. 
101. Solove & Hartzog, New Common Law, supra note 97, at 625–26; see also FTC v.
Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 616–17 (D. N.J. 2014). 
102. Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data
Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2232 (2015); Solove & Hartzog, New Common 
Law, supra note 99, at 586, 607 (“Technically, consent orders legally function as contracts 
rather than as binding precedent.  Yet, in practice, the orders function much more broadly 
than a contract between a company and the FTC.  In the world of privacy law practice, 
everything the FTC says and does is delicately parsed, like the statements of the Chairman 
of the Federal Reserve.”). 
103. Solove & Hartzog, New Common Law, supra note 97, at 620. 
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consumer-protection powers under Section 5 of the FTC Act, which 
declares unlawful “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce.”104  A practice is deceptive if it involves (1) an act 
(representation, omission, or practice) that would (2) deceive a 
reasonable consumer in a manner that is (3) material.105  Meanwhile, a 
finding of unfairness requires (1) a substantial injury (2) without 
offsetting benefits that (3) consumers cannot reasonably avoid 
themselves.106 
A recent ruling by a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has thrown the FTC’s ability to enforce 
Section 5 against telecommunications firms into some doubt.107  While 
Section 5 applies generally to “persons, partnerships, or corporations,” 
it exempts several classes of firms from its scope.108  Among these are 
“common carriers subject to the Acts to regulate commerce.”109  The 
FTC has long maintained that this provision does not deprive it of 
Section 5 authority over the non-common-carrier services of firms that 
otherwise operate as common carriers.110  For instance, under the 
FTC’s interpretation, the common-carrier exemption would prevent the 
Commission from enforcing Section 5 against AT&T’s wireline 
telephone operations—which the FCC regulates as a common-carrier 
service under Title II of the Communications Act—but would allow it 
to apply Section 5 to AT&T’s wireless services, which Title II does not 
cover.111 
The Ninth Circuit panel rejected this interpretation, however.112  
In the first federal appellate opinion to consider the issue, the panel 
held that a firm which engaged in any regulated common-carrier 
104. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). 
105. Letter from James C. Miller III, Chairman, FTC, to Hon. John D. Dingell,
Chairman, House Comm. on Energy & Commerce (Oct. 14, 1983), reprinted in In re 
Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 1984 WL 565319, at *45–50 (1984) (decision & 
order). 
106. Letter from FTC Comm’rs to Wendell H. Ford & John C. Danforth, Senators (Dec.
17, 1980), reprinted in In re Int'l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1984 WL 565290, at *97 
(1984); see also 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).  
107. FTC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 835 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2016), reh'g en banc granted, 
No. 15-16585, 2017 WL 1856836 (9th Cir. May 9, 2017).  
108. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2).
109. Id.
110. See Comment of the Staff of the Bureau of Consumer Protection of the Fed. Trade
Comm’n to the Fed. Comm. Comm’n, WC Dkt. No. 16-106, FCC 16-39 at 3 fn. 6 (May 27, 
2016), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/60002078443.pdf [hereinafter FTC Comment Letter].  
111. AT&T Mobility, 835 F.3d at 995–98.
112. Id. at 1003.
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activity was entirely exempt from regulation under Section 5.113  Thus, 
under the Ninth Circuit decision, the FTC would be barred from 
bringing a Section 5 complaint against AT&T’s (non-common-carrier) 
broadband services because the FCC regulates AT&T’s wireline 
telephony services under Title II.114  However, the circuit has since 
reheard the case en banc, vacating its opinion.115  It appears likely that 
the court will agree with the FTC’s longstanding interpretation on 
rehearing.  
2. The FTC’s Substantive Approach to Broadband Privacy
Data-privacy advocates have suggested that there are three major
points on which the FTC’s regulation of broadband privacy will differ 
from the FCC’s since-aborted approach.  First, they note that the FTC 
generally has not required consumer approval for first-party 
marketing,116 whereas the Broadband Privacy Order did not allow for 
such an exception.117  Second, they point out that the FTC generally 
only requires customers’ opt-in approval for collecting information 
classified as “sensitive,”118 whereas the FCC would have required opt-
in approval for collection of all content data.119  Finally, they observe 
that the FTC typically does not mandate any form of approval for 
tracking users’ web-browsing and app-usage habits, whereas the FCC 
would have required opt-in approval for this practice.120 
However, the FTC’s statements about the privacy practices of 
broadband providers strongly suggest it will enforce broadband privacy 
in a manner that is largely consonant with the FCC’s rules.  Though 
many of the commenters in the FCC broadband privacy proceeding 
appeared to assume that the FTC would take the same approach in 
enforcing Section 5 against broadband providers as it does against 
other firms,121 in fact the Commission has given strong indications that 
113. Id. at 998.
114. See id. at 995–98.
115. AT&T Mobility, 2017 WL 1856836.
116. FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at 40–42.
117. Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶ 9.
118. See, e.g., Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, Fed.
Trade Comm’n v. Frostwire, LLC, No. 1:11-cv-23643, at ¶¶ 22–32, ¶¶ 41–43 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 
7, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/10/
111011frostwirecmpt.pdf [hereinafter Frostwire Complaint]; FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra 
note 48, at 58–60.  
119. Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶ 5.
120. Frostwire Complaint, supra note 117, at ¶¶ 22–32, 41–43; FTC PRIVACY REPORT,
supra note 46, at 58–60.  
121. See, e.g., Doug Brake et al., Broadband Privacy: The Folly of Sector-Specific 
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it sees broadband privacy as sui generis, and deserving of more 
stringent safeguards. 
The Commission has detailed its views primarily in two 
documents: a 2012 report, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of 
Rapid Change (“FTC Privacy Report”),122 and comments to the FCC 
regarding broadband privacy.123  The views expressed in these 
documents are not necessarily representative of how the FTC will 
actually enforce Section 5 against broadband providers,124 and the 
approach of the Republican-majority Trump FTC may differ from 
those of the Democrat-majority Obama FTC.  Nevertheless, they are 
helpful guides to understanding how the Commission might enforce 
Section 5 against broadband providers. 
The FTC has articulated two significant respects in which the 
privacy practices of broadband providers might warrant different 
treatment from those of firms in other industries.  First, though the 
Commission has never brought a Section 5 action against a firm for 
collecting non-sensitive information, it has stated that broadband 
providers should offer opt-in choice for collection of sensitive and non-
sensitive information alike through deep packet inspection.125  The 
Commission stated in its Privacy Report that it “has strong concerns 
about the use of DPI for purposes inconsistent with an ISP’s interaction 
with a consumer, without express affirmative consent or more robust 
protection.”126  It reinforced this view in its comments in the FCC 
broadband privacy rulemaking, encouraging the FCC to require opt-in 
consent for any collection of content data through deep packet 
inspection—not just the types of information the Commission had 
previously deemed sensitive.127 
Second, the FTC has reasoned that broadband providers should 
allow customers some form of choice before tracking their movements 
across the internet.128  The basis for this view can be found in the FTC 
Privacy Report, in which the Commission reasoned that firms should 
Regulation, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. 5 (Mar. 2016), http://www2.itif.org/2016-
broadband-privacy-folly.pdf?_ga=2.236078978.222908656.1517294711-
1584549091.1517294711 (comparing FCC regulation to the (apparently monolithic) “FTC 
approach”).  
122. FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at iii.
123. See FTC Comment Letter, supra note 110.
124. See FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at iii.
125. FTC Comment Letter, supra note 110, at 21. 
126. FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at 56.
127. Compare FTC Comment Letter, supra note 122, at 20, with FTC PRIVACY REPORT,
supra note 46, at 58–60.  
128. FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at 27.
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provide notice and choice where data collection is inconsistent with the 
context of their relationship with users.129  Applying this principle to 
the tracking of users across third-party websites, the FTC reasoned that 
such tracking is “unlikely to be consistent” with the context of the web-
browsing experience.130 
These statements lend a different perspective on the FTC’s likely 
enforcement of Section 5 in the context of broadband providers’ 
privacy practices.  If the FTC enforces Section 5 against broadband 
providers according to its policy statements, there would only be two 
differences between the commissions’ enforcement of broadband 
privacy.  First, the FTC would not require any form of customer 
approval for first-party marketing that makes use of data not collected 
through deep packet inspection or third-party tracking,131 whereas the 
FCC would have required opt-out approval for the use of such data.132  
Second, the FTC would likely require that firms provide only opt-out 
choice for the collection of web-browsing and app-usage data by 
broadband providers,133 whereas the FCC would have required opt-in 
choice.134 
C. Comparing FCC and FTC Regulation of Broadband Privacy
The FTC’s approach to regulating broadband privacy will likely
be quite similar to the approach embodied in the FCC’s since-repealed 
Broadband Privacy Order.  While the FCC’s rules would have been 
more privacy-protective than the FTC’s enforcement of Section 5 is 
likely to be, the FTC’s substantive approach is preferable from the 
perspective of consumer welfare, because it will enable broadband 
providers to compete in nearby data-intensive markets.  In addition, the 
FTC’s standards-based procedural approach is preferable to the FCC’s 
regulation through prescriptive rulemaking, because it allows for 
needed flexibility in quickly evolving markets. 
1. Comparing the Commissions’ Substantive Rules
The difference between the commissions’ rules regarding first-
party marketing likely appears more significant than it really is. 
Because the FTC has endorsed approval rules for the collection of 
129. Id.
130. Id. at 41.
131. Id. at 40–44.
132. Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶ 199.
133. FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at 40–42.
134. Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶ 167. 
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content data and information regarding third-party web browsing and 
app usage,135 the difference in the commissions’ approaches boils down 
to the treatment of information about a particular user’s current 
subscription(s) to service.  The FCC would have required opt-out 
approval for use of this data,136 whereas the FTC would not require 
customer approval.137  Because consumers rarely bother to exercise 
privacy choices at all,138 the difference between an opt-out rule and a 
rule requiring no approval at all is actually not as significant as the 
difference between opt-in and opt-out rules would have been.  It may 
further be supposed that the customers who choose to opt out of 
marketing are less likely to read marketing appeals in the first place. 
Accordingly, the difference between the commissions’ rules on this 
point is negligible. 
The only remaining significant difference between the 
commissions’ approaches is the treatment of web-browsing and app-
usage data.  Thus, the determination of which commission’s privacy 
regulation is more consumer-friendly will hinge on a comparison of 
their approaches on this score.  The FCC’s opt-in rule is plainly more 
privacy-protective than the FTC’s likely opt-out rule.  However, a 
comparison of the effects of the rules on consumer welfare must take 
into account the effect on consumers as a whole—not just the effect on 
consumer privacy.  More stringent privacy rules are not necessarily 
better for consumers.  Where data is an important input, rules that 
restrict data collection, storage, and use run the risk of degrading the 
quality of services, making data-intensive markets more concentrated 
and harming consumer welfare to an extent that may not be offset by 
the regulations’ privacy benefits.139  This is particularly true where 
regulation has the effect of increasing barriers to entry.140  
135. FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at 40–41. 
136. Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶¶ 198–99. 
137. FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at 40–44.
138. See J. Howard Beales, III & Timothy J. Muris, Choice or Consequences:
Protecting Privacy in Commercial Information, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 109, 114–115 (2008). 
One oft-cited example of the “stickiness” of default settings comes in the context of organ 
donations.  Though Americans widely approve of organ donation, only about a quarter 
actually opt-in to the organ donation system.  By contrast, organ donation is nearly universal 
in countries that set the default at “donate” and require would-be non-participants to opt out.  
See Steve Lohr, The Default Choice, So Hard to Resist, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/technology/default-choices-are-hard-to-resist-online-
or-not.html.  
139. See DAVID S. EVANS, ED., PLATFORM ECONOMICS: ESSAYS ON MULTI-SIDED
BUSINESSES 222–24 (2011).  
140. J. Thomas Rosch, Do Not Track: Privacy in an Internet Age, FED. TRADE COMM’N
20–21 (Oct. 14, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/
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Accordingly, one must evaluate the effects of the commissions’ 
rules on markets.  The FCC did not engage in an economic analysis in 
its Broadband Privacy Order.  While it compared broadband providers’ 
access to user data to that of edge providers,141 the degree of access a 
firm has to a particular input does not necessarily correlate to its ability 
to compete in a given market. 
The most obvious market in which collecting user data would 
better enable broadband providers to compete is the market for 
advertising intermediation.  Ad intermediaries are firms that connect 
content publishers with advertisers.142  Publishers sell space on their 
websites indirectly to advertisers through intermediaries, who then 
decide which ad to serve a given user based on information about that 
user’s characteristics.143  This may be relatively crude data, such as 
demographic information, or more detailed data, such as information 
about a given user’s predilections and browsing habits.144 
Increased competition is generally thought to redound to the 
benefit of consumers, and there is no reason to think ad intermediation 
is an exception.  A lack of competition would likely lead to higher 
prices for ad intermediation services, in turn lessening the take of 
advertising revenue that content publishers see.  This would likely 
cause publishers to produce less content, which could be thought of as 
a form of output reduction—the central harm antitrust law seeks to 
address.145  
On the one hand, allowing broadband providers to collect web-
browsing and app-usage data subject only to opt-out choice may make 
the ad intermediation market more competitive by enabling new 
entry.146  On the other hand, broadband providers may be able to collect 
so much data, or may be able to collect data so cheaply, that they could 
out-compete all other firms and achieve dominance in the ad 
intermediation market.  This would force other firms that wish to 
compete in ad intermediation to first enter the broadband market in 
do-not-track-privacy-internet-age/111014-dnt-loyola.pdf. 
141. Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶¶ 28, 37, 35.
142. EVANS, supra note 137, at 215.
143. Id. at 217, 241.
144. Id. at 241.
145. See id. at 246.
146. See Letter from J. Howard Beales III, Professor of Strategic Mgmt. & Pub. Pol’y at
the Geo. Wash. Sch. of Bus., to Tom Wheeler, Chairman, Fed. Comm. Comm’n, RE: 
Docket No. 16-106, Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other 
Telecommunications Services 8–10 (May 27, 2016), https://
scholarspace.library.gwu.edu/downloads/6969z0820 (describing higher regulatory burdens 
on broadband providers as entry barrier). 
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order to gain comparable access to data.147  New America’s Open 
Technology Institute peddled a version of this argument in its 
comments to the FCC, maintaining that allowing broadband providers 
to collect customer data would enable them to “thrust themselves into 
any other market where competitors normally must pay for intelligence 
about and access to target audiences.”148 
It must be noted at the outset that this is not an issue for antitrust 
law: no one is claiming that permissive collection rules would grant 
broadband providers a monopoly on ad-intermediation data, and even if 
this were the case, antitrust does not recognize stand-alone “monopoly 
leveraging” claims.149  Regulators, however, have more flexibility than 
antitrust authorities.  They may proscribe a practice where it threatens 
harm to the competitive environment, regardless of whether it rises to 
the level of an antitrust violation.  Engaging in such “competitive 
handicapping” raises concerns of its own,150 but first let’s explore the 
case for handicapping here. 
In order to evaluate the effect broadband providers’ entry might 
have on the ad intermediation market, one must first understand the 
dynamics of that market.  Ad intermediation is a two-sided market: 
intermediaries provide value by reducing search costs among 
advertisers and publishers, connecting content publishers who have ad 
space to sell with advertisers seeking to reach users.151  Ad 
intermediation appears to accord with the general rule that two-sided 
markets skew toward a dynamic of “winner take all” or “a few winners 
take all,” given the presence of network effects and large fixed costs 
that produce economies of scale.152  The market has become more 
concentrated since the FTC determined in 2007 that it was “highly 
147. See Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Michal S. Gal, Access Barriers to Big Data, 59 ARIZ. L.
REV. 339, 375 (2017).  
148. See Reply Comments of New Am.’s Open Tech. Inst., In re Protecting the Privacy
of Customers of Broadband and other Telecommunications Services, WC Dkt. No. 16-106, 
at 7 (Jul. 6, 2016), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10707717014775/2016-07-06%20-%20OTI%
20Broadband%20Privacy%20Reply%20Comments%20FINAL.pdf.  Note that the premise 
of this comment is questionable.  For instance, just as broadband providers gain income 
from charging for broadband services, Google and Facebook gain revenue from charging 
advertisers to display ads on their own sites, in addition to monetizing user data by selling 
ads on third-party sites.  
149. See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458–59 (1993); see also
Joseph Kattan, The Decline of the Monopoly Leveraging Doctrine, ANTITRUST 41, 41–42 
(1994).  
150. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 314 (1984).
151. EVANS, supra note 137, at 215–18.
152. Id. at 14–15, 213, 276.
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fragmented and correspondingly competitive.”153  One indication of 
this is that Google and Facebook together account for about half of 
display advertising revenue.154 
Given the strong positions of Google and Facebook in the market 
for ad intermediation, it seems unlikely that broadband providers’ 
collection of web-browsing and app-usage data would enable them to 
achieve dominance.  This is particularly true given that Google and 
Facebook’s access to web-browsing and app-usage data rivals that of 
broadband providers, if not outpacing it.155  Google and Facebook track 
users’ browsing habits across much of the internet by loading cookies 
onto websites for which they provide ad-intermediation or data-
analytics services.156  Their strong market positions are thus self-
reinforcing: the more ad intermediation services they provide, the more 
data they are able to collect.  Google is present in some form on over 
eighty percent of all third-party sites, with Facebook hovering around 
thirty-five percent.157  Four other firms are present on between ten and 
twenty percent of sites.158 
Moreover, while a firm’s supra-competitive profits in one market 
may in theory enable it to price below marginal cost in another 
market,159 Google and Facebook would appear to have both the 
resources and incentives to withstand a price war in the ad 
intermediation market indefinitely.160  And it does not appear that 
broadband providers’ costs of obtaining and analyzing data are less 
than those of Google and Facebook, so long-term predatory pricing 
would likely be unsustainable and therefore irrational.161 
153. STATEMENT OF FED. TRADE COMM’N CONCERNING GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK 8, n.8
(2007), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/418081/071220
googledc-commstmt.pdf. 
154. See David Kirkpatrick, EMarketer: Google, Facebook Together Command 51.6% 
of Digital Display Advertising, MARKETING DIVE (Mar. 15, 2017), https://
www.marketingdive.com/news/emarketer-google-facebook-together-command-516-of-
digital-display-adver/438129/.  
155. See Peter Swire et al., Online Privacy and ISPs (May 2016 working paper),
http://www.iisp.gatech.edu/working-paper-online-privacy-and-isps; but see Aaron Rieke et 
al., What ISPs Can See: Clarifying the Technical Landscape of the Broadband Privacy 
Debate, UPTURN (Mar. 2016), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/60002077347.pdf. 
156. See Steven Englehardt & Arvind Narayanan, Online Tracking: A 1-Million-Site
Measurement and Analysis 11 (last visited Feb. 17, 2018) https://
webtransparency.cs.princeton.edu/webcensus/. 
157. Id. at 8–9. 
158. Id.
159. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 217
(1993).  
160. See id. at 225.
161. See id.
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The situation of large upstarts challenging entrenched firms in an 
adjacent market is strikingly similar to one the FCC faced over thirty 
years ago in its Computer Inquiries.162  For years, the Commission 
barred firms that maintained a dominant position in the wireline 
telephony market from entering the separate market for “enhanced” 
wireline telephony services unless they did so through a separate 
subsidiary.163  Eventually, however, the FCC considered doing away 
with that requirement and allowing telephony providers, such as AT&T 
and the Bell Operating Companies (“BOCs”), to enter the market for 
enhanced services subject to less onerous safeguards.164  Enhanced-
service vendors argued that the economies of scale enjoyed by AT&T 
and the BOCs would allow those firms to eliminate competition in the 
enhanced-services market, just as privacy advocates today warn of the 
threat posed by broadband providers in the ad intermediation market.165  
The Commission rejected this contention, however, instead accepting 
AT&T’s argument that its entry would make the market for enhanced 
services more competitive because it was a late, non-dominant entrant, 
and because the enhanced-services market already featured large 
providers such as IBM and GTE that would be able to compete on an 
equal footing with AT&T and the BOCs.166 
The situation in ad intermediation is more or less a repeat of the 
debate over enhanced services, with dominant broadband providers 
playing the role of AT&T and the BOCs, and Google and Facebook 
playing the role of IBM and GTE.  There is again reason to think that 
the large upstarts’ entry will make the market more competitive. 
Because their access to user data is independent of their presence 
serving ads on other firms’ websites, broadband providers are uniquely 
positioned to compete with Google and Facebook in ad intermediation, 
at least in theory.  Indeed, the mere threat of broadband providers’ 
entry into the ad intermediation market may be enough to constrain the 
ability of Google and Facebook to raise prices for content publishing 
and advertising services.167 
And even in the unlikely event that broadband providers do drive 
162. See Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
(Third Computer Inquiry), 104 F.C.C.2d 958, 962–69 (1986) [hereinafter Computer III]. 
163. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Second
Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980).  
164. Computer III, supra note 163, at 964.
165. Id. at 997.
166. Id. at 991, 1010.
167. See Bernard Caillaud & Bruno Jullien, Chicken & Egg: Competition among
Intermediation Service Providers, 34 RAND J. ECON. 309, 321–22 (2003).  
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Google, Facebook, and other competitors from the ad intermediation 
market, they would presumably still be faced with competition in that 
market from other broadband carriers.  It is unlikely that any one 
provider enjoys sufficiently broad access to user data that it could 
dominate the ad intermediation market, were Google and Facebook to 
somehow abdicate their positions.  Thus, allowing broadband providers 
to track users across apps and websites is likely to drive down prices in 
the ad intermediation market in both the short and long term, which 
would presumably redound to consumers’ benefit in the form of more 
and/or better content from publishers (which will have more funds to 
invest in content development), as well as more relevant ads (because 
advertisers, enjoying lower costs per ad, will place more ads).  This 
could be viewed as an increase in output, which is the central goal of 
American competition law. 
Meanwhile, the privacy harms occasioned by allowing broadband 
providers to collect web-browsing and app-usage data appear relatively 
insignificant, at least when compared with the potential harms 
occasioned by deep-packet inspection.  Whereas broadband providers 
would theoretically have unparalleled access to content data if they 
engaged in deep packet inspection to the full extent of their technical 
abilities, their access to web-browsing data would be matched by at 
least Google, given its presence on the great majority of websites and 
its ability to collect data through both the Chrome browser and the 
Android ecosystem.168  Indeed, Commissioner O’Rielly has argued that 
broadband providers’ collection of web-browsing and app-usage data 
would cause no harm to consumers, given that such data is already 
widely collected and traded.169  O’Rielly is probably overstating the 
case.  Nevertheless, the point that regulators must focus on the 
marginal harm of data collection is well-taken. 
Accordingly, once one accounts for competitive effects on the ad 
intermediation market, it is not so clear that the substantive rules 
embodied in the FCC’s Broadband Privacy Order would have been 
better for consumers on the whole.  Indeed, from a general consumer 
welfare perspective, FTC jurisdiction over broadband privacy appears 
preferable to FCC jurisdiction. 
168. See Swire, supra note 156, at 23, 75–77. 90–93; Petition for Reconsideration, In re
Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and other Telecommunications Services, 
WC Dkt. No. 16-106, at 2–7 (Dec. 21, 2016), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/1221003408004/
Oracle_Broadband_Privacy_Petition_for_Reconsideration.pdf [hereinafter Oracle Pet’n for 
Reconsideration].  
169. See Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶¶ 216–17 (O’Rielly, Comm’r,
dissenting) (“[A]ll that the FCC has really done is raise the transaction costs”).  
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2. Comparing the Commissions’ Procedural Approaches
Moreover, the procedural flexibility afforded by Section 5 of the
FTC Act is better-suited to broadband-privacy enforcement than is the 
FCC’s prescriptive rulemaking approach.  The costs and benefits of 
privacy regulation are difficult to measure in general,170 but they are 
particularly so in cases like this, where the extent to which the 
regulated firms plan to collect data and the uses to which they plan to 
put that data are unclear.171  As David Evans has observed, broadband 
“and the Web are very new technologies by historical standards,” and 
thus call for modesty on the part of regulators.172  Regulatory modesty 
is particularly warranted in light of the staggering gains in dynamic 
efficiency often brought by advances in technology173—gains that can 
be blunted by overly aggressive regulation.  The FTC’s standards-
based enforcement is more sensitive to potential dynamic efficiencies 
because it enables the Commission to easily adapt its approach amidst 
rapid change. 
The comments in the FCC’s broadband privacy proceeding174 
underscore just how speculative the costs and benefits of data 
collection by broadband providers really are at the moment.  The 
discussion was characterized by vagueness on both sides.  The FCC 
was widely panned for failing to conduct a cost-benefit analysis at 
all,175 and for failing to provide any evidence of perhaps its primary 
justification for the Broadband Privacy Order: that the adoption of 
privacy rules would speed broadband adoption.176  However, opponents 
170. See Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 369, 392 (2016) (“Skeptics charge that cost-benefit analysis persistently 
undervalues threatened harms that are diffuse, cumulative, and difficult to describe in 
monetized, present-value terms, and that it therefore predictably works to the advantage of 
vested economic interests.”).  
171. See FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at C-7–8 (Rosch, Comm’r, dissenting)
(contending that the FTC should wait to see whether broadband providers will actually 
engage in deep packet inspection before requiring such providers to obtain opt-in consent 
from their customers).  
172. EVANS, supra note 137, at 265. 
173. See Thomas O. Barnett, Maximizing Welfare Through Technological Innovation, 
15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1191, 1194–96 (2008) (“[D]ynamic efficiency accounts for the 
lion's share of efficiency/welfare gains.”) 
174. See Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other
Telecommunications Services, WC Dkt. 16-106. 
175. See, e.g., Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶ 219 (O’Reilly, Comm’r,
dissenting).  
176. One survey found that less than 0.5% of broadband non-adopters “report privacy
concerns as the primary reason for not subscribing.”  Thomas Lenard and Scott Wallsten, An 
Economic Analysis of the FCC’s Privacy Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, TECH. POL’Y 
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of the FCC’s rule didn’t do much better in assessing costs and 
benefits—an indication, perhaps, that those costs and benefits have not 
yet become sufficiently clear to analyze cogently.  For instance, rather 
than offer specific examples of areas in which restrictive rules might 
hamper innovation, AT&T pointed to past Internet innovations that the 
FCC’s rules would have blocked, had those rules been in place at the 
time.177  AT&T did mention that data collection and end use might 
enable broadband providers to enter the markets for apps or “over-the-
top ‘edge services’ ”  such as video streaming or Voice Over Internet 
Protocol (VOIP).178  But opponents of the FCC’s rules failed to explain 
how access to data would enable broadband providers to compete in 
these markets in a manner that would actually enhance economic 
welfare, rather than simply shift profits from one group of firms to 
another. 
The technology of data collection, storage, and analysis is itself 
still evolving, as well.  For instance, whether deep packet inspection 
will prove economically feasible will largely hinge on future advances 
in data-storage technology.179  Likewise, whether privacy-protective 
technologies such as encryption and VPNs might provide an effective 
substitute for regulation remains to be seen.180  Waiting until costs and 
benefits become somewhat more definite before deciding which 
practices to condemn increases the likelihood that regulators will arrive 
at the right result.  This is the lesson of the Pennsylvania stop-look-
and-listen rule in negligence law: novel circumstances may cast a 
practice that has heretofore appeared unquestionably unreasonable in a 
new light.181 
Accordingly, the FTC’s measured, case-by-case approach better 
lends itself to regulatory realism in this area.  It allows the Commission 
to focus on actual harms rather than speculative ones, and avoids 
forcing it to predict changes in technology and business practices. 
Meanwhile, the slow pace of informal rulemaking under the 
Administrative Procedure Act exacerbates the inflexibility of 
prescriptive rules like the FCC’s.  As Jeffrey Eisenach has observed, 
INST. 20 (May 2016), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/60002055729.pdf (drawn from data in 
Bureau of Census for U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Current Population Survey, July 2015 
(2016)).  
177. AT&T Comment Letter, supra note 47, at 51–53.
178. Id. at 55, 59.
179. See Feamster Comment Letter, supra note 43, at 6.
180. See id.
181. See James Fleming Jr. & David K. Sigerson, Particularizing Standards of Conduct
in Negligence Trials, 5 VAND. L. REV. 697, 704–05 (1952).  
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“once a rule is in place, it can take at least as long to modify or repeal it 
as it took to pass it in the first place, creating the possibility that rules 
designed to address an ephemeral problem persist long after the 
problem is resolved—and so are transformed from cure to disease.”182  
The FTC’s willingness to rely on a broader range of regulatory 
measures than the FCC represents another source of flexibility.183  For 
instance, the FTC has embraced self-regulatory models, urging firms to 
collaborate on a standard “do not track mechanism” that would give 
consumers greater control over cross-website tracking.184  In addition, 
the FTC’s historically nuanced assessment of the manner in which 
firms provide choice helpfully plays down the distinction between opt-
in and opt-out choice.185  For instance, in its enforcement proceedings, 
the Commission often emphasizes the prominence of a firm’s notice-
and-choice mechanism over the issue of what type of choice the firm 
provides (opt-out or opt-in).186  This flexible and nuanced approach to 
regulation enables the FTC to achieve privacy goals in a minimally 
intrusive manner.  While the FCC may well have developed a similar 
approach in time, the FTC’s long experience bodes well for its 
regulation of broadband privacy.  And while the FTC may lack 
industry-specific expertise, its privacy expertise is likely more relevant 
in the context of broadband privacy.  Moreover, though the FCC’s 
historical focus on competition as well as consumer-protection 
concerns would appear to give it an advantage in regulating in an area 
that incorporates both, this apparent edge was muted by the 
Commission’s complete failure to address the effect its rules would 
have on adjacent markets in the Broadband Privacy Order. 
All told, then, there is little reason to think that consumers would 
have been better off under the FCC’s broadband privacy regime than 
they will be under the FTC’s Section 5 enforcement.  As it considers 
bringing privacy-enforcement actions against broadband providers, the 
182. Jeffrey Eisenach, Broadband Competition in the Internet Ecosystem, AM.
ENTERPRISE INST. 28 (Oct. 2012), https://www.aei.org/publication/broadband-competition-
in-the-internet-ecosystem/.  
183. See Philip J. Weiser, The Future of Internet Regulation, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
529, 557-58 (2009) (“The FTC is much more comfortable with and inclined to consider the 
potential use of self-regulation than the FCC”).  
184. FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at 52–55.
185. Id. at 50–52.
186. See, e.g., Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable and Monetary
Relief, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Vizio, No. 2:17-cv-00758, at ¶ 23 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 2017), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/170206_vizio_2017.02.06_complaint.pd; 
Complaint, In re Sears Holding Mgmt. Corp., No. C-4264, at ¶ 13 (Aug. 31, 2009), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2009/09/090604searscmpt.pdf.  
2018] BROADBAND PRIVACY 87 
FTC should resist calls from privacy advocates to raise its threshold for 
consumer choice regarding web-browsing and app-usage data. 
III. THREE QUESTIONS FOR THE FTC REGARDING BROADBAND
PRIVACY 
Several significant questions linger regarding the FTC’s Section 5 
enforcement in the context of broadband privacy.  Some were thrashed 
out before the FCC, but warrant reexamination, while others concern 
circumstances unique to the FTC’s approach. 
A. Are Broadband Providers Special?
The most commonly heard criticism of the FCC’s Broadband
Privacy Order was that it failed to harmonize with the FTC’s 
approach.187  This assertion is a bit puzzling, however, given that the 
FTC has indicated that certain types of large platform providers, 
including broadband providers, should be subjected to more stringent 
data-privacy obligations than other firms.188  To be sure, split 
regulatory authority over broadband would “not [have been] optimal,” 
as the FTC acknowledged in its comments on the Broadband Privacy 
Order.189  Hard regulatory boundaries can be especially problematic 
when it comes to industries like broadband, where technology threatens 
to swamp “the jurisdictional boundaries of the existing administrative 
framework.”190  Nevertheless, no one disagrees with the premise that 
some factors, such as access to data, do indeed justify different data-
privacy rules for different firms.  Taking as a given the principle that 
similarly situated firms should be regulated similarly, a key question 
for the FTC regarding broadband privacy is what differences among 
firms might justify differential privacy regulation. 
The FTC has openly grappled with the issue of whether broadband 
providers and other large platform providers should be subjected to 
different privacy rules since as early as 2012.  The Commission 
evaluated the issue in its Privacy Report,191 and held a workshop on the 
187. See Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶ 209 (Pai, Comm’r, dissenting)
(“[S]ince the beginning of this proceeding, I have pushed for the Federal Communications 
Commission to parallel the FTC’s framework as closely as possible”). 
188. FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at 55–57.
189. FTC Comment Letter, supra note 122, at 8.
190. Cohen, supra note 171, at 397; see also Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model for
Internet Policy, 1 J. TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. L. 37, 46 (2002) (“[T]he Internet sows 
confusion when it comes into contact with the dominant horizontal categorization approach” 
embodied in the Communications Act”). 
191. FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at 55–57.
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subject later that year.192  In the Privacy Report, the FTC started from 
the principle that the privacy practices of large platform providers such 
as broadband providers and the makers of operating systems and 
browsers raise particular concerns because these entities have “very 
broad access to a user’s online activities,” and are thus able to track 
users “for purposes inconsistent with the context of [users’] 
interaction” with the firm.193  Specifically addressing broadband 
providers, the FTC reasoned as follows: 
ISPs serve as a major gateway to the Internet with access to vast 
amounts of unencrypted data that their customers send or receive 
over the ISP’s network.  ISPs are thus in a position to develop 
highly detailed and comprehensive profiles of their customers—and 
to do so in a manner that may be completely invisible.  In addition, 
it may be difficult for some consumers to obtain alternative sources 
of broadband Internet access, and they may be inhibited from 
switching broadband providers for reasons such as inconvenience 
or expense.  Accordingly, the Commission has strong concerns 
about the use of DPI for purposes inconsistent with an ISP’s 
interaction with a consumer, without express affirmative consent or 
more robust protection.194 
In a single paragraph, the FTC identifies three variables that may 
justify imposing different degrees of regulation on different firms: the 
visibility of the firm’s data collection; whether the firm has market 
power; and the firm’s degree of access to user data.195  Let’s take these 
issues one at a time. 
1. Market Power
Both the FCC and the FTC appear to assume that a firm’s power
in the broadband market should be an important consideration for 
regulators of broadband privacy.  In its Privacy Report, the FTC 
asserted that so-called “take-it-or-leave-it” choice is problematic where 
competition offers customers few alternatives.196  It suggested that a 
firm with market power should not be allowed to condition provision 
192. The Big Picture: Comprehensive Online Data Collection, FTC (Dec. 6, 2012),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2012/12/big-picture-comprehensive-
online-data-collection.  
193. FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at 55.
194. Id. at 56.
195. The Commission also noted that technological differences in and of themselves do
not merit differential treatment, cautioning that “any framework should be technology 
neutral.” Id.  
196. Id. at 50–51.
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of a service on whether users permit the firm to collect their data.197  
The FCC echoed this view in the Broadband Privacy Order, prohibiting 
“ ‘ take-it-or-leave-it’ offers in which [broadband] providers offer 
broadband service contingent on customers surrendering their privacy 
rights.”198  Even the late FTC Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch, a 
longtime antitrust practitioner who dissented from the Privacy Report, 
agreed that more onerous regulations should apply to broadband 
providers with market power than to those without.199 
However, it is actually not so clear that a broadband provider with 
market power in broadband has any advantage over broadband 
providers without market power when it comes to collecting user data. 
Whether in a competitive or a monopoly market, the rational firm will 
choose the combination of price and privacy protection that maximizes 
profit.  Assuming that users are able to understand and value privacy 
protections—that is, assuming that privacy is not an externality—a firm 
that is already charging the monopoly price for its service would have 
no incentive to degrade privacy.  Doing so would be tantamount to 
increasing price—but again, the combination of price and privacy is 
already set at the profit-maximizing level.  Degrading privacy without 
changing price could only reduce profits.  In this respect, monopoly 
providers are no different from providers in a competitive broadband 
market.  Whether in a competitive or a monopoly market, every offer is 
take-it-or-leave-it: buy my product, or buy someone else’s (or don’t 
buy at all). 
If the assumption that users are able to properly value privacy 
protections is incorrect, then there would indeed be no check on 
broadband providers that wished to degrade privacy.  However, this 
would be equally true of providers with market power as those without. 
Accordingly, market power in broadband cannot be said to provide 
broadband providers the opportunity exploit consumers, apart from the 
extent to which they are already exploiting them by charging high 
prices.  In the absence of price regulation, then, market power in 
broadband services should not have any bearing on privacy regulation. 
2. Visibility
The visibility of broadband providers’ data collection practices, on
the other hand, would appear to present a valid reason for asymmetric 
regulation.  In its Privacy Report, the FTC justified its conclusion that 
197. Id. at 50–52.
198. Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶ 294.
199. FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at C-7–8 (Rosch, Comm’r, dissenting).
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broadband providers should be subjected to more stringent privacy 
rules in part on the ground that they are able to collect data “in a 
manner that may be completely invisible.”200  The FCC similarly 
concluded that broadband providers’ data collection is less visible than 
that of edge providers, because the latter “only have direct access to the 
information that customers choose to share with them by virtue of 
engaging their services.”201   
The FCC’s phrasing overstates the case—a consumer can hardly 
be said to have “consented” to data collection by invisible third parties 
such as Google and Facebook simply by browsing third-party 
websites—but the general assumption that broadband providers’ data 
collection is less visible to users than that of other firms seems sound, 
given that few customers are aware that such providers collect user 
data at all.  If this is indeed the case, it would provide a valid reason to 
require more onerous notice requirements of broadband providers. 
This is generally in line with the FTC’s insistence that firms give 
“prominent notice” where their data collection is “[in]consistent with 
the context of a particular transaction or the consumer’s relationship 
with the business.”202 
However, whether choice rules should differ based on the 
visibility of data collection, as the FTC appeared to insist,203 is a more 
complicated issue.  While notice is the usual regulatory solution to 
information externalities, choice is typically thought to solve for a 
different externality: facilitating bargaining where transaction costs 
would otherwise prevent it.  If choice only helps users overcome 
hurdles to bargaining for greater privacy protection, then the visibility 
of a given privacy practice should not bear on whether choice is 
required.  Visibility presents solely an informational problem.  
But the provision of opt-in choice also plays an important if little-
acknowledged role in informing consumers.  It incentivizes firms to 
make their privacy notices clear and prominent, because firms will 
want to encourage consumers to exercise the choice and opt in.  This 
may provide a rationale for subjecting less-visible practices to opt-in 
choice requirements in situations where there is reason to believe that 
notice alone may not suffice.   
It may also explain the FTC’s seemingly anomalous stance in 
urging the FCC to classify content data obtained through deep packet 
200. Id. at 56.
201. Broadband Privacy NPRM, supra note 18, at 2547.
202. FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at 27.
203. Id.
2018] BROADBAND PRIVACY 91 
inspection as sensitive, and thus subject to opt-in choice.204  The FTC 
had never before suggested that all content information should be 
classified as sensitive.205  If it really held that view, it would 
presumably have brought an enforcement action against Google for its 
longstanding practice of collecting content data through Gmail without 
requiring opt-in approval.  The relative invisibility of data-collection 
via deep packet inspection, however, may explain the FTC’s position. 
3. Access to Data
Access to data is the remaining consideration the FTC offered as a
rationale for differential regulation of broadband providers in its 
Privacy Report.  According to the FTC, greater access to data calls for 
more restrictive privacy rules, because it enables a firm to develop a 
more granular picture of users.206  The FCC adopted this premise in the 
Broadband Privacy Order, reasoning that broadband providers’ 
supposed access to more data than other large platform providers 
justified stricter privacy rules.207 
Whether broadband providers actually do enjoy more access to 
user data than do edge providers, particularly Google, was hotly 
debated before the FCC.  The FCC concluded that they did,208 
following the same finding by the FTC.209  A number of commenters 
strenuously argued this conclusion was incorrect,210 particularly in light 
of Google’s prevalence on other firms’ websites and in the markets for 
browsers and mobile devices.211  Evaluating the issue in depth is 
beyond the scope of this article, but it should at least be noted that 
whether broadband providers have a data advantage over edge 
providers is debatable.  It is unclear whether broadband providers 
actually do have access to more data; unclear how much value content 
data adds to app-usage and web-browsing data; unclear whether 
broadband providers will be able to monetize that data any time soon; 
204. See FTC Comment Letter, supra note 122, at 20–21.
205. FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at 58–60.
206. Id. at 55–56.
207. Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶¶ 28–37.
208. Id.
209. FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at 56.
210. See Swire, supra note 156; Reply Comments of the Int’l Ctr. for Law & Econ., In
re Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and other Telecommunications 
Services, WC Dkt. No. 16-106, ICLE 14–15, (July 6, 2016), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/
file/10707812924625/ICLE%20-%20Privacy%20NPRM%20Reply%20Comments.pdf 
(arguing that the quality of data broadband providers may collect is probably inferior to that 
of edge providers, and that such data is thus more difficult to monetize). 
211. Oracle Pet’n for Reconsideration, supra note 169, at 4–7.
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and possible that encryption will wipe out any advantage broadband 
providers might enjoy.  In addition, the issue of which factors a 
regulator should take into account in determining which firm has 
greater access to data is up for debate (e.g., whether regulators should 
consider a firm’s superior data-analytics abilities, or economic barriers 
to harvesting data in additional to technical ones).  
More fundamentally, however, it is not so clear that a firm’s 
greater ability to collect data (however defined) should necessarily 
entail more stringent regulatory treatment.  First, as described above in 
the analysis of the effect that enforcement of broadband privacy might 
have on the ad intermediation market, firms’ different positions in 
secondary markets may warrant different treatment.212 
Second—perhaps counterintuitively—greater access to data might 
actually call for more lenient regulatory treatment.  True, firms that 
collect more data may be able to cause more privacy harm on a per-
byte basis, because more insights can be gleaned from analyzing data 
points collectively than from doing so separately.  But the other side of 
the coin is that the benefits of data collection by large firms may be 
disproportionately large, as well, for exactly the same reason.  This is 
not to say that this is necessarily a zero-sum game: whether large 
platform providers deserve stricter or looser rules will depend on a 
regulator’s assessment of the benefits and drawbacks of data collection 
in a particular context.  How a regulator should make this assessment is 
beyond the scope of this Article, which merely seeks to frame the issue 
appropriately. 
B. How Should the FTC Reconcile Broadband Privacy and Net
Neutrality?
Advocates of net neutrality argue that government intervention is 
necessary to prevent broadband providers from discriminating against 
certain types of edge providers.  Now that the FCC has reversed its 
decision to reclassify broadband as a Title II common carrier service—
rescinding its Open Internet Order, which imposed net neutrality 
rules—the FTC and the Department of Justice will presumably be 
tasked with policing anticompetitive discrimination by broadband 
providers under antitrust law.  
As Professor Paul Ohm has pointed out, however, enforcement of 
212. See Computer III, supra note 163, at 985 (noting that regulatory burdens may differ
based on the “economic characteristics of both the service provider and the market for that 
service”); see infra Part II.C.2.  
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broadband privacy rules could be used as a backdoor means of net 
neutrality regulation.213  Any privacy rules that prevent broadband 
providers from scrutinizing the data that flow through their networks 
could prevent providers from engaging in differential treatment of edge 
providers, because broadband providers “cannot discriminate between 
packets without scrutinizing them first.”214  The broadband privacy 
debate is thus inextricably intertwined with the issue of net neutrality. 
In enforcing its privacy standards against broadband providers, the 
FTC will have to determine whether providers should be granted an 
exception to monitor traffic for purposes of differential treatment. 
Professor Ohm views privacy considerations as a kind of plus-
factor that provides additional support for net neutrality regulation: 
An architecture of discrimination is an architecture of surveillance, 
one that can be lent out to intelligence agencies, copyrighted 
content owners, and subpoena-wielding civil litigants to reveal 
everybody's deepest secrets.  A neutral network is a more private 
network.215 
In Professor Ohm’s conception, a procompetitive instance of 
discrimination—say, requiring a video provider like Netflix to pay for 
its disproportionate use of bandwidth, enabling broadband providers to 
reduce prices for users—might be overcome by privacy concerns, and 
rendered unlawful.216  In other words, privacy concerns may push 
otherwise unobjectionable discriminatory treatment over the line into 
unreasonableness.   
The idea of taking privacy into account in considering differential 
pricing of broadband service is effectively a dead letter, however, now 
that net neutrality has become an issue for antitrust enforcement. 
Consumer concerns such as privacy have no role in American antitrust 
analysis, unless they can be folded into an argument that a particular 
practice will decrease output.217  For instance, as Richard Posner has 
pointed out, the fact that fewer cars on the road would lead to less 
pollution would not be a valid defense in an antitrust suit against 
colluding automakers.218 
We might reverse Professor Ohm’s hypothetical, however, and 
213. Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV.
1417, 1490–96 (2009).  
214. Id. at 1490.
215. Id. at 1494. 
216. Id. 
217. See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Consumer Movement, 15
ANTITRUST BULL. 361, 362–63 (1970). 
218. Id. at 363–65. 
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ask whether procompetitive or otherwise welfare-enhancing differential 
treatment should save a practice that would otherwise be condemned 
under the FTC’s privacy standards.  There is no barrier to the FTC 
considering non-privacy issues in enforcing Section 5 against a 
broadband provider for its privacy practices, given Section 5’s broad 
condemnation of unfair and deceptive acts and trade practices.  While 
allowing differential treatment to save a practice under Section 5 would 
run counter to the populist version of net neutrality, it is logically 
consistent with Professor Ohm’s proposal to treat net neutrality as a 
concern of general welfare, rather than a narrow economic proposition. 
And it must be pointed out that differential treatment of edge providers 
is in fact often procompetitive. 219  As Jonathan Nuechterlein has 
observed, not even the most fervent net neutrality advocate thinks that 
broadband providers should never be allowed to treat packets 
differently.220  Instead, the argument advanced by net neutrality 
advocates is that broadband providers have too much power in the 
market for Internet access, and could abuse that power by trying to 
promote their own affiliates to the detriment of competitors in the 
adjacent markets for applications and content.221  Where a broadband 
provider discriminates against certain types of traffic not to favor its 
own products, but instead to better allocate costs among the users of its 
pipes, its action will generally by procompetitive. 
The FTC should thus carve out an exception to its broadband 
privacy standards to allow for differential treatment of edge providers 
where such treatment is procompetitive and welfare-enhancing.  This 
would be akin to the exception in the FCC’s Broadband Privacy Order 
for “reasonable network management” practices.222  The FCC found 
that management practices are reasonable and therefore lawful where 
they are “primarily used for and tailored to achiev[e] a legitimate 
network management purpose, taking into account the particular 
network architecture and technology of the broadband service.”223  
219. Dennis L. Weisman & Robert B. Kulick, Price Discrimination, Two-Sided Markets,
and Net Neutrality Regulation, 13 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 81, 97 (2010) (“By 
creating incentives for an ISP to charge lower prices on the subscriber side of the market, 
price discrimination on the content side of the market increases the total number of 
transactions between content providers and subscribers—precisely the conditions under 
which price discrimination is likely to increase social welfare.”). 
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Here, scrutinizing network traffic to the extent necessary to make 
decisions regarding procompetitive differential treatment should 
qualify as something akin to reasonable network management.   
Failing to carve out such an exception could give edge providers 
an incentive to use encryption tools for no other purpose than to 
frustrate broadband providers’ attempts to treat their traffic differently. 
Encryption in this circumstance would either make it more costly or 
impossible for broadband providers to impose differential treatment on 
different types of traffic, thereby reducing welfare.  The relevant 
question under Section 5 should instead be whether a firm has 
exceeded the scope of its procompetitive purpose for collecting and 
processing user data. 
C. Will the FTC Prioritize Broadband Privacy?
As detailed above, the FTC’s approach to the substantive privacy
issues involving broadband providers will in all likelihood be largely 
similar to the FCC’s.224  However, the effect that FTC privacy 
regulation has on broadband providers will depend in large part on how 
it monitors providers, how deeply it investigates them, and how often it 
actually brings enforcement actions against them.  This section seeks 
guidance in the Commission’s past statements and its pattern of Section 
5 enforcement to determine how its enforcement of broadband privacy 
will actually play out.  The FTC’s close scrutiny of Google, another 
large platform provider, and the Commission’s responsiveness to 
privacy concerns when they are raised in the media indicate that it is 
likely to watch broadband providers fairly closely. 
The FCC would likely have devoted considerable resources to 
enforcing its broadband privacy rules had Congress not repealed the 
Broadband Privacy Order, given that broadband would have been 
essentially the only industry over which the Commission had exclusive 
privacy enforcement authority.225  In contrast, broadband is only one of 
many industries under the auspices of the FTC’s Section 5 jurisdiction. 
The FTC brings only twenty-five or so privacy and data-security cases 
per year, and does not have the resources to scrutinize every firm 
closely.   
Does this mean that broadband providers might fly under the 
224. See supra Part II.C.1.
225. The Telecommunications Act also provides for the privacy of satellite and cable
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radar, now that they fall within the scope of the FTC’s jurisdiction? 
Answers are not easily found in FTC enforcement actions against 
broadband providers prior to the FCC’s 2015 reclassification, because 
the FTC has never brought such an action, save for a 2009 complaint 
against DIRECTV and Comcast for violating do-not-call laws.226  
However, this lack of enforcement actions is not particularly revealing, 
because broadband privacy has only emerged on regulators’ radars 
fairly recently. 
Instead, given the FTC’s view that large platform providers raise 
unique privacy concerns, the Commission’s treatment of Google may 
provide the clearest hint of how it will scrutinize broadband providers’ 
privacy practices.  The FTC has brought only one privacy complaint 
against Google in its history, in a garden-variety failure-to-disclose 
case.227  On the whole, however, it has monitored Google’s business 
practices quite closely.  For instance, the FTC in 2012 conducted a 
major investigation into whether Google’s data-collection and other 
practices warranted an antitrust enforcement action, though it 
eventually decided not to file a complaint.228  There is thus reason to 
think the FTC will examine broadband providers’ practices fairly 
closely, as well. 
The attention afforded broadband providers’ privacy practices in 
the press may also increase the likelihood of FTC enforcement.  The 
Commission frequently files complaints on the heels of news reports of 
invasive privacy practices—perhaps because it is responding to what it 
perceives to be the will of the public, perhaps because sniffing out 
privacy violations is easier when advocacy and media groups lead the 
way.  For instance, both the FCC and FTC privacy-enforcement actions 
concerning the use of supercookies by Verizon and its partners 
followed widespread media attention on the practice.229  And the FTC’s 
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2015 complaint against Nomi Technologies, a firm that tracked 
customers around retail stores, came on the heels of a feature about the 
company in The New York Times.230  Continued scrutiny of broadband 
providers by consumer advocates and the media may thus make 
privacy enforcement actions in this arena more likely.  
CONCLUSION 
Regulators are only beginning to grapple with the issues raised by 
the privacy practices of broadband internet providers.  Despite the 
widespread assumption that the FCC’s governance of broadband 
privacy would have been more robust than the FTC’s, the analysis 
presented here suggests that the commissions’ practices are actually 
likely to be quite similar.  Nonetheless, a number of unanswered 
questions remain about how the FTC will enforce Section 5 against 
broadband providers.  How the Commission answers these questions 
will do much to determine how effective its regulation will be. 
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